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Subjective Proportionality* 
Patrick Tomlin 
 
forthcoming in Ethics 
Abstract: Philosophers writing about proportionality in self-defence and war 
will often assume that defensive agents have full knowledge about the threat 
that they face and the defensive options available to them. But no actual 
defensive agents possess this kind of knowledge. How, then, should we make 
proportionality decisions under uncertainty? The natural answer is that we 
should move from comparing the harm we will do with the good we will 
achieve to comparing expected harm with expected good. I argue that this 
simple calculation is flawed, and begin to develop a more sophisticated account 
of ‘subjective proportionality’. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers who write about proportionality in self-defence and war will often set 
things up in this way: Attacker threatens Victim with harm. Victim knows that if she 
does nothing, she will suffer x units of harm. Victim also knows that if she does Action 
A, she will inflict y units of harm on to Attacker, and that this will produce outcome z 
(e.g., will fully prevent the attack). In other words, perfect knowledge is assumed 
about the attack and the defensive options available to the defensive agent. This is 
unproblematic insofar as we are interested in what Thomas Hurka calls ‘objective 
proportionality’1, where we weigh the actual harm caused against the actual good it 
                                               
* I have benefitted from discussion with, and comments from, Helen Frowe, Alex Gregory Adil Haque 
Robert Jubb, Seth Lazar, Kieran Oberman, Jonathan Parry, David Plunkett, and Steve Woodside. The 
paper was presented at the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace, Normative Orders at 
Goethe Universität, Frankfurt, and the Universities of Oxford, Southampton, Glasgow, Pennsylvania, 
and Reading. Once submitted, the paper was much improved by several sets of comments and clear 
guidance from Cécile Fabre, David Wasserman, and an anonymous Ethics referee. I owe special thanks 
to two people. The first is Jeff McMahan. It was at his urging that I first began to write up some inchoate 
thoughts on proportionality and risk, and he has offered help and guidance at many points since. The 
second is Victor Tadros, for many discussions on these topics. While writing the paper, I received 
support from Goethe Universität’s Justitia Amplificata and Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften. 
1 Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 34-66, at 
38. Alternatively, we can call this ‘fact-relative proportionality’. For the idea of fact-relative 
proportionality, see Jeff McMahan, ‘Proportionality and Time,’ Ethics 125 (2015): 1-25, at 11, drawing on 
Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 5. 
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achieves.2 But few, if any, defensive agents (be they private individuals, states, or 
soldiers) will ever face a violent situation in which they possess perfect knowledge of x, 
y, and z. Therefore, how we should make proportionality calculations under 
conditions of empirical uncertainty is an important moral and practical question in 
the ethics of war and self-defence.3 We can call this the question of ‘subjective 
proportionality’.4 
 
Developing an account of subjective proportionality is important for two reasons. 
First, since it concerns how agents should perform proportionality calculations from 
within the epistemic position they in fact inhabit, such an account is the starting point 
for developing a proportionality standard that can be action-guiding. Second, since it 
takes into account the agent’s epistemic position, such an account will be essential in 
developing a standard on the basis of which we can judge behaviour, and so attribute 
praise, blame, and, potentially, punishment.5 
 
Few philosophers have written explicitly on this topic. But there does seem an obvious 
way to move from objective proportionality to subjective proportionality. Since, put 
                                               
2 It is important to note that I claim that assuming away uncertainty about harm and good is 
unproblematic for objective (or fact-relative) proportionality, not objective (or fact-relative) 
permissibility. I leave it open here whether risk can be relevant to fact-relative permissibility. For 
example, I take no stand on Seth Lazar’s claim that ‘risky killings’ are ‘objectively worse’ (and therefore 
sometimes objectively impermissible, in virtue of the ex ante risks). See: Seth Lazar, ‘Risky Killing: How 
Risks Worsen Violations of Objective Rights,’ Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming); Sparing 
Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), ch. 4; ‘Risky Killing and the Ethics of War,’ Ethics 126 
(2015): 91-117. I am grateful to Seth Lazar, Steve Woodside, and an Ethics referee for useful comments 
here. 
3 As will become clear, I use ‘uncertainty’ in a non-technical sense here, since I presume that we can 
attach probabilities to various outcomes. 
4 Following Derek Parfit’s distinction between evidence- and belief-relative permissibility, Jeff McMahan 
suggests that what Hurka and I call ‘subjective proportionality’ can usefully be divided into evidence- 
and belief-relative standards of proportionality. The considerations that I argue for here should be 
taken into account by both evidence- and belief-relative proportionality, since they concern how to take 
intentions and probabilities into account, and the probabilities in question could be evidence- or belief-
derived. For simplicity, I will assume here that defensive agents believe and act on the best evidence 
available, thereby collapsing McMahan’s distinction. See: McMahan, ‘Proportionality and Time,’ 11. 
5 There are two different direct roles that subjective proportionality might play in assigning blame and 
punishment. It might be a necessary condition of justification. Or it might be an excuse for having 
produced an objectively disproportionate, and thus unjustified, outcome. However, subjective 
proportionality’s role in a blameworthiness or legal standard may be indirect, since the right theory of 
subjective proportionality may be too complex to expect, for example, soldiers to use it in the heat of 
battle. If that is the case, heuristics, rules of thumb, and realistic laws would need to be developed. 
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simply, proportionality involves comparing harm caused with good produced6, when 
moving from objective to subjective proportionality it is natural to move from 
comparing actual harm with actual good to comparing expected harm with expected 
good. (These ‘expected’ values are calculated by looking at each possible outcome, 
multiplying it by the probability that it will eventuate, and then summing these 
figures). This is how Thomas Hurka suggests we do things in his important and 
influential essay ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, going so far as to suggest that 
it is the only plausible way for proportionality calculations to take uncertainty into 
account. Hurka claims that when assessing a prospective war’s proportionality 
if the war has only some small probability of achieving relevant goods … then 
its expected harm is excessive compared to its expected good. If it takes 
account of probabilities in this way, as on any plausible view it must, the ad 
bellum proportionality condition incorporates hope-of-success considerations, 
and it can also incorporate last-resort considerations.7 
 
From this, we can draw two key claims. 
(1) On any plausible view, subjective proportionality assessments must take 
probabilities into account. 
(1) is surely correct. I will not question it here. 
 
(2) On any plausible view, probabilities should be taken into account by checking 
whether expected harm is excessive when compared to expected good. Call this 
Hurka’s Test. 
 
Hurka’s Test can give rise to this Simple View of subjective proportionality: 
                                               
6 Throughout I will assume that proportionality involves measuring harms against goods. This is 
controversial, but nothing I say here hangs on this particular comparison. Others are free to substitute 
their own metrics. For alternative metrics, see Jonathan Quong, ‘Proportionality, Liability, and 
Defensive Harm,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 144-173; F.M. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies: Terror, 
Torture, and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 133-134. 
7 Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War,’ 37. 
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Simple View: Hurka’s Test exhausts subjective proportionality. A defensive 
action (or course of action) is subjectively proportionate if and only if its 
expected harm is not excessive compared to its expected good.8 
 
I have two main aims in this paper. The first is to show that the Simple View is false. I 
reject the Simple View because – even if we complicate it a little, as we will – it 
ultimately rests on this assumption, which I will argue is fundamentally flawed: 
The Separation Assumption: subjective proportionality assessments must 
consider all of the potential harms that may occur, and then, separately, all of 
the potential goods that may result. The collective of potential harms must 
then be compared with the collective of potential goods.  
 
Put simply, I reject this Separation Assumption because it separates the harms from 
the goods, and this rules out taking account of what pairings of harm and good may 
come into existence together. In particular, the Separation Assumption therefore rules 
out taking into account whether or not a defensive action will be, or is likely to be, 
objectively disproportionate. I will argue that subjective proportionality must take this 
into account. 
 
My second aim is to begin to develop a more sophisticated, and more plausible, 
account of subjective proportionality. In doing so, I will come to reject not only the 
Simple View, but any role whatsoever for Hurka’s Test: the direct comparison between 
expected harm and expected good is, in my view, irrelevant to subjective 
proportionality. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I introduce some key concepts and 
distinctions from the literature on proportionality in self-defence and war. I also 
introduce some different ways in which defensive agents may be uncertain when faced 
                                               
8 The Simple View is suggested by Hurka’s text, but cannot be attributed to him, since he says that 
proportionality must ‘take account of probabilities’, and that the way to do so is through Hurka’s Test. 
He does not, however, explicitly state that this test is the only test (though he does not mention any 
others). I will later reject any role for Hurka’s Test. I am grateful to Hurka for some useful feedback and 
for help with clarifying his view (or at least his view in this paper – I do not claim it is his current view). 
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with a threat. In Section III I complicate the Simple View a little, so that it is able to 
take account of some of the distinctions and concerns introduced in Section II, and 
other non-consequentialist concerns. I identify the key assumption – the Separation 
Assumption – which underpins any version of the Simple View. 
 
I then attack this assumption on two bases. In Section IV I show that this assumption 
cannot properly accommodate the moral significance of intentional harm. Many 
philosophers working on self-defence and war consider intentional harm to be morally 
distinct from merely foreseen harm. I consider a variety of ways that one could try to 
accommodate the significance of intentional harm within the Simple View, and all are 
found wanting. I argue instead that it matters for proportionality whether or not the 
defensive agent’s intended harm will lead to objectively proportionate outcomes, and 
that this means taking into account the pairing of the intended harm and the good it 
will produce. I delineate two different ways in which we could take account of this 
pairing, but both require us to reject the Separation Assumption. In Section V, I 
further examine this idea by focusing on what intended harm must be measured 
against. It matters, as I argue in Section IV, whether or not intended harm ‘leads to’ 
objectively proportionate outcomes. But, as I show in Section V, this claim is 
ambiguous between several readings. An intended harm may lead to a plurality of 
possible good outcomes, and some of these may be objectively proportionate, and 
others objectively disproportionate. I ask whether it matters that the collective of 
potential good outcomes that lie causally downstream from the intended harm are, 
taken together, acceptable, or whether we must justify the intended harm as 
proportionate to the good it is intended to produce. I explain why I think intended 
harm must be proportionate to the intended good. 
 
In Section VI I present my second objection to the Separation Assumption – it ignores 
whether an action risks objectively disproportionate outcomes, how likely such 
outcomes are, and how seriously objectively disproportionate they might be. We can 
do so, I argue, if we take account of a measure I call Expected Objective 
Disproportionality. Section VII examines what role this measure might play in a theory 
of subjective proportionality. Section VIII concludes. 
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Through this discussion, the beginnings of a more plausible, and more complex, 
positive account of subjective proportionality will emerge. There are some elements of 
this account in which I have greater confidence than others. I will be clear about 
which elements I am unsure of as I proceed. Often, my aim will be less to defend a 
particular view, than to articulate a difficult issue for the emerging account, and to 
present the candidate views one might hold. I hope to show, at minimum, that not all 
plausible accounts of subjective proportionality involve the comparison between 
expected harm and expected good. 
 
II PROPORTIONALITY, DEFENSIVE HARM, AND UNCERTAINTY 
Before proceeding to my critique of the Simple View, it will be useful to briefly outline 
the role of proportionality in justifying defensive harm, some different kinds of 
proportionality that have been delineated in the literature, and how they interact with 
some other concepts in justifying defensive harm. I will also identify some different 
ways in which agents may be uncertain when faced with a threat. 
 
Proportionality, as we understand it here, is a limit on violence. In punishment theory, 
proportionality is sometimes taken to be a just aim – both less-than-proportionate 
punishments and more-than-proportionate punishments are seen as unjust. But 
proportionality in self-defence and war is not a just aim, it is a limit on the pursuit of 
just aims: proportionality condemns more-than-proportionate harms, but is silent on 
harms that fall below the limit that it establishes. For a given level of good to be 
achieved, proportionality establishes a maximum amount of proportionate harm. For a 
given level of harm, proportionality established a minimum amount of good that must 
be achieved. 
 
Proportionality is not the only limiting concept in justifying defensive force. If a 
plurality of possible defensive actions are proportionate, the principle of necessity 
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states that (all else equal) we should pick the option that minimizes harm.9 
Proportionality and necessity thus act in concert, as independent limits on defensive 
force: proportionality demands that defensive acts do enough good, given the harm 
they will inflict; necessity demands that defensive acts do no more harm than is 
necessary to achieve a good outcome. 
 
The literature on proportionality, like work on the ethics of self-defence and war more 
generally, has become much more sophisticated in recent years. Jeff McMahan has 
identified a key distinction within the concept of proportionality, between what he 
terms ‘narrow proportionality’ and ‘wide proportionality’.10 Narrow proportionality 
concerns defensive harm to those who are culpable (or perhaps merely responsible) 
for a threat, and are thus potentially liable to the defensive harm. When an agent is 
liable to harm, she has no right against it, and thus is not wronged by the harm. Wide 
proportionality concerns harm to innocent third parties, which require a ‘lesser-evil’ 
justification. Unlike liability-justified harms, lesser-evil harms infringe rights, but 
provided enough good is done, these infringements can be widely proportionate, and 
thus potentially permissible. In this paper I will often focus on narrow proportionality 
cases, but everything I say is, unless I indicate otherwise, supposed to apply to wide 
and narrow proportionality alike. 
 
Alongside McMahan’s narrow-wide distinction, another important distinction for us 
here is that between objective and subjective proportionality. Objective 
proportionality is used to evaluate outcomes – particular pairings of harm and good 
that come into the world together. Subjective proportionality concerns whether an act 
is proportionate given the evidence available to the agent, or the beliefs of the agent.11 
In examples in which there is only one possible outcome from a defensive action, the 
two forms of proportionality map precisely onto one another – if the act is certain to 
                                               
9 This is a simplistic statement of the necessity principle, but it will do for our purposes here. For 
complexities, see: Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 
3-43; and Jeff McMahan, ‘Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello’ in Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar, 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Ethics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
10 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19-29 
11 As previously stipulated, for the purposes of this essay I assume that agents believe and act upon the 
best evidence available to them. 
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be objectively disproportionate, it is also subjectively disproportionate, and the agent 
ought not to perform it. However, under uncertainty these two kinds of 
proportionality can come apart. Consider a case where, in order to avert a minor harm 
to myself (such as a scratch) I perform a defensive act which I reasonably believe will 
cause minor harm to an attacker. However, things go wrong, and I end up 
unintentionally killing him. We need moral language to describe the act from both the 
subjective and objective perspective. The act turned out to be disproportionate – it did 
not do enough good to justify that level of harm, and had I known I would cause that 
level of harm, I would not have been permitted to proceed. So, it is objectively 
disproportionate. However, it was also subjectively proportionate – the evidence 
suggested I would do very little harm. 
 
There are two key ‘inputs’ to an objective proportionality calculation – the harm the 
defensive agent does, and the good it achieves. When we turn our focus to subjective 
proportionality, the defensive agent can (and ordinarily will) face uncertainty about 
both. Uncertainty about the amount of harm the defensive agent will do is easy 
enough to understand: if Victim attempts to punch Attacker, she might give him a 
black eye, but there’s also a small chance she will kill him, miss altogether, or 
accidentally harm Bystander. Let’s call this Harm Uncertainty. Harm Uncertainty can 
concern whether a given action will succeed in harming at all, the extent of any harm, 
and who will suffer it.12 There can also be uncertainty about the moral status of those 
who will be harmed – I can be sure I will harm Bob, but unsure as to whether he is 
innocent or responsible, and thus whether we are dealing with narrow or wide 
proportionality.13 
 
                                               
12 Interestingly, in his ‘Justifying Harm’ David Rodin appears to be outlining an approach to subjective 
proportionality, as he takes some forms of uncertainty into account – in particular what I call Threat 
Uncertainty and Outcome Uncertainty. And yet when Rodin comes to consider the defensive harm, he 
does not take account of Harm Uncertainty (see 92). (However, see 97 where he refers to ‘the 
magnitude and expected probability of the threatened and defensive harms’, and 105). This omission 
means that Rodin’s account is silent on what I show here is a very complex issue: how to combine Harm 
Uncertainty and a concern for intentional harm. See: David Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm,’ Ethics 122 (2011): 
74-110, 
13 For comments on this latter kind of uncertainty in a war context, see Seth Lazar, ‘The Responsibility 
Dilemma for Killing in War: a review essay,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010): 180-213. 
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Uncertainty about the good that the defensive agent will do, however, is more 
complicated, and can, for our purposes, be broken down usefully into two subtypes, 
which, temporally-speaking, fall either side of the harm that the defensive agent 
inflicts, or attempts to inflict. The first, which precedes the defensive harm, is Threat 
Uncertainty. This is uncertainty about the level of the threat Victim faces. Threat 
Uncertainty frames the entire choice-making situation that the defensive agent faces: 
since she doesn’t know how much harm she will suffer if she allows the threat to 
eventuate, she does not know how much harm she will prevent, and thus how much 
good she will do, by fully averting the threat. 
 
The second kind of uncertainty about the good a defensive action will achieve is 
Outcome Uncertainty. Outcome Uncertainty is like Threat Uncertainty, in that it is 
uncertainty concerning how much good a defensive action will do. But it is also like 
Harm Uncertainty, in that it is uncertainty about the defensive agent’s own actions 
and their potential consequences. Outcome uncertainty concerns the effectiveness of a 
defensive harming action (and therefore lies temporally downstream from Harm 
Uncertainty). For example, the defensive agent may be sure that she faces a given 
threat, and certain that she can punch the attacker, giving him a black eye, but 
uncertain as to whether this will deter him, make no difference, or anger him, thereby 
exacerbating the threat. 
 
Whilst the Hurka quotation with which we began specifically references ad bellum 
proportionality, the present essay also concerns both in bello proportionality and 
proportionality in self-defence, and will draw upon self-defence examples. While the 
precise relationship between individual self-defence and the ethics of war is 
controversial, most philosophers believe that our thinking about one can rightly 
inform our thinking about the other.14 There are also controversial questions about 
whether ad bellum and in bello proportionality must be assessed in the same or 
                                               
14 This includes Hurka (‘Proportionality in the Morality of War,’ 38-39). For an overview of the debate 
concerning the relationship between war and self-defence, see Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and 
Peace (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), ch. 2. 
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different ways.15 For the purposes of this essay, I am happy to allow that the ‘good’ in 
in bello proportionality may differ markedly from the relevant goods in ad bellum or 
self-defence proportionality calculations. I try to articulate, here, a framework, and 
different accounts of the relevant harms and goods can be plugged into that 
framework. 
 
III NON-CONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
Recall the Simple View, which states that subjective proportionality is reducible to 
Hurka’s Test – it is a comparison between expected harm and expected good. Some 
may be concerned that the Simple View is clearly too simple, and a position that only 
the simplest variants of consequentialism would endorse. Through McMahan’s 
distinction between narrow and wide proportionality we can already see that objective 
proportionality is more complex than a simple comparison between harm and good – 
whether the party to be harmed is responsible or innocent makes a difference – and so 
surely subjective proportionality must be more complex than a simple comparison 
between expected harm and expected good. 
 
The distinction between responsible threats and innocent third parties is only one of 
several complicating factors to which philosophers have argued that proportionality 
ought to be sensitive. McMahan argues that whether or not harm is intended or 
foreseen is another major factor that can affect proportionality calculations. David 
Rodin goes further: he identifies two forms of proportionality (based on liability and 
lesser-evil justifications, or narrow and wide proportionality in McMahan’s terms), 
each of which are sensitive to fourteen distinct morally relevant factors.16 In addition 
to these concerns, in cases in which we may harm or save more than one person, 
proportionality may also be sensitive to distributive concerns, such as whether harms 
are distributed equally or unequally, and whether we can simply aggregate small 
goods for the many in order to justify large harms to the few.17 The Simple View, with 
                                               
15 See, for example: Jeff McMahan, ‘Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello’. 
16 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, 19-29; Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’. 
17 In cases in which we must choose whom to save, many philosophers believe that no number of small 
harms, like minor headaches, could add up to outweigh a single life. A related position could be taken 
regarding harming-to-save cases: you should never kill to prevent any number of minor headaches. On 
-11- 
 
its comparison between expected harm and expected good, may seem deaf to these 
concerns. 
 
We can, however, slightly complicate Hurka’s Test, and thus the Simple View, in order 
to take account of these, broadly speaking, non-consequentialist concerns. The best 
way to do this is to morally-weight the harms in question. So, for example, all else 
equal, harming an innocent person creates a greater amount of morally-weighted harm 
than harming a culpable aggressor, and so it is harder to justify, requiring more good 
to be achieved in order to be proportionate. This is what Hurka himself does.18 
According to a suitably amended account of proportionality, objective proportionality 
asks us to compare morally-weighted harm with good, while the Simple View of 
subjective proportionality would ask us to compare expected morally-weighted harm 
(or, perhaps, morally-weighted expected harm) with expected good. 
 
Even on this more sophisticated reading, however, the Simple View contains a core 
assumption, which, I will argue, renders it irredeemably flawed. As a reminder, that 
assumption is as follows: 
The Separation Assumption: subjective proportionality assessments must 
consider all of the potential harms that may occur, and then, separately, all of 
the potential goods that may result. The collective of potential harms must 
then be compared with the collective of potential goods. 
 
The Simple View, and the related Separation Assumption, are certainly prima facie 
attractive. It is natural to assume that since we are concerned with morally-weighted 
harm and good at the objective level, we will be concerned with expected morally-
weighted harm and expected good at the subjective level. It seems plausible to 
suppose that we will be concerned by the same things at the objective and subjective 
                                               
the saving cases see, for example: Alex Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?,’ 
Ethics 125: 64-87; Larry S. Temkin, Rethinking the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). I am 
doubtful of this sort of view. See: Patrick Tomlin, ‘On Limited Aggregation,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 
45 (2017): 232-260. 
18 See ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War,’ 57-66, where Hurka discusses how to weigh harms to 
different parties in a war. This approach is recommended for necessity in Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-
Defense and War’. 
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level, and thus that all we need to do to find the right account of subjective 
proportionality is to modify our account of objective proportionality to include a 
concern for probabilities. 
 
Nevertheless, I will argue that the Simple View and the Separation Assumption are 
flawed. The Separation Assumption does not allow us to take the different pairings of 
harm and good that may come into existence together into account, which in turn 
rules out considering the objective proportionality or disproportionality of these 
pairings. Against this, I will argue that there are two different ways in which subjective 
proportionality ought to take pairings of harm and good into account. First, in 
Sections IV and V, I will argue that in trying to take account of the moral significance 
of intended harm, we must take the pairing of the intended harm and the good that it 
will lead to into account – it matters whether intended harms will lead to objectively 
proportionate outcomes. Second, In Sections VI and VII, I will argue that we must take 
account of whether, how seriously, and how likely, our action is to be objectively 
disproportionate. We can only do so if we reject this Separation Assumption. 
 
IV INTENTIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The first line of objection to the Simple View, and the Separation Assumption which 
underpins it, concerns intended harm.19 McMahan and Rodin both make a distinction 
between intentional and foreseen defensive harms within their accounts of 
proportionality.20 In doing so, they endorse a weak version of the Doctrine of Double 
Effect (DDE). On some versions of the DDE, all intentional harming is automatically 
                                               
19 It may be thought that since I refer here to intended harm, I have automatically made my claims 
irrelevant to war, since in war (1) only combatants may be intentionally harmed; (2) all enemy 
combatants are liable to be killed; (3) combatant deaths are irrelevant to proportionality. Traditional 
just war theory accepts (3), but I think it is mistaken. We should not kill thousands of soldiers to 
protect a small strip of unimportant territory (see Jeff McMahan, ‘Liability, Proportionality, and the 
Number of Aggressors,’ in Saba Bazargan and Samuel Rickless, eds., The Ethics of War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016)). In addition, I am skeptical of both (1) and (2) as part of the ‘deep 
morality’ of war. 
20 Some versions of the DDE focus not on intended harm, but on intended effects on a person that 
foreseeably lead to harm. I aim to be neutral between these formulations here, and references to 
‘intended harm’ can be interpreted as ‘intended effects which foreseeably harm’. See: Warren Quinn, 
‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 
(1989): 334-351; Victor Tadros, ‘Wrongful Intentions without Closeness,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 
(2015): 52-74. 
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ruled out as impermissible. On weaker, non-absolutist versions, intentional harm is 
harder to justify in comparison with foreseen harm of the same magnitude.21 Weak 
versions of the DDE, therefore, essentially demand different moral weightings for 
intended and foreseen harm. The Weak DDE leads to this claim about proportionality: 
Weak DDE: Whether harm is intentional or foreseen affects the moral 
weighting of harm. There are some levels of good for which it would be 
proportionate to inflict x units of harm on a person as a side-effect, but would 
be disproportionate to inflict x units intentionally.  
 
The DDE is often discussed using cases in which we know how much harm will be 
done, for example the well-known trolley cases. As we shall see here, however, how to 
incorporate the moral significance of intentions into situations which involve Harm 
Uncertainty is a complex question.22 Even those who disagree with my conclusions 
here will, I hope, at least see that it is far from obvious how we should incorporate 
intentions into subjective proportionality, and a range of possible positions will be 
developed and explored. 
 
In what follows, I accept the Weak DDE. The Weak DDE will be compatible with the 
Simple View if we can amend the ‘expected harm’ element of Hurka’s Test to take 
account of the difference between intended and merely foreseen harms. In the 
remainder of this section, I will try out a few ways of doing this. Each is found 
wanting. This leads me to develop an alternative way of capturing the significance of 
intentional harm within a theory of subjective proportionality – one that is not 
compatible with the Simple View. 
 
Let us begin by examining the how the Weak DDE works in a case, like those typically 
presented, in which the defensive agent knows how much harm she will do. Imagine 
                                               
21 For an overview, see: Alison McIntyre, ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect (2014). 
22 It is, furthermore, independent of the already complex question of how to identify ‘intended’ and 
‘foreseen’ harms under conditions of uncertainty. I put aside that difficult question here, and focus on it 
in ‘Accidentally Killing on Purpose’ (unpublished m/s). Here I consider only cases in which there is a clear 
intended harm (or a clear intended effect on the person which, if it eventuates, will lead to a particular 
level of harm). 
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you attack me and I shoot at you, intending and knowing that this shot will kill you. 
Two things seem relevant here, on the harm side – the amount of harm (death), and 
that the harm was intended. These are listed as two of Rodin’s fourteen morally 
relevant factors.23 Rodin’s approach implies that amount of harm and the intention to 
harm are two independent factors. A plausible interpretation of this is that when a 
defensive agent intends harm, this adds a consistent multiplier to the harm done. That 
would give us this view in certainty cases: 
Multiplier: whenever some harm is done intentionally, a set multiplier is 
applied to the level of harm. Morally-weighted harm = harm x i 
 
Let’s say that i=5. For 10 units of intentional harm, the morally-weighted harm would 
be 50. Multiplier may seem plausible in cases where we are certain as to how much 
harm we will do, and I think this is how most people see the Weak DDE working. The 
simplest way to convert this view into a view about subjective proportionality, and the 
one that seems most faithful to Hurka’s Test, is to simply replace harm with expected 
harm.24 This gives us: 
Multiplier (Subjective): whenever some harm is done intentionally, a set 
multiplier is applied to the level of expected harm. Morally-Weighted Expected 
Harm = Expected Harm x i 
 
Multiplier (Subjective) is compatible with the Simple View. This view is problematic, 
however, because a uniform weighting is applied, regardless of how much harm is 
intended, to all harmful outcomes, whether those are intended or not. Consequently, 
Multiplier (Subjective) cannot differentiate between these two cases: 
Finger or Intentional Death: Attacker threatens Victim with a broken finger. 
Victim responds, intending to kill Attacker by shooting him, in order to avert 
her finger being broken, but with only a small chance of success. If Victim 
misses, the loud noise will frighten and thus distract Attacker such that he will 
                                               
23 Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, 81, 92-95. 
24 To be clear, while I used Rodin’s work to generate Multiplier as a plausible operationalisation of the 
Weak DDE for certainty cases, I do not mean to suggest that Multiplier (Subjective) is his considered 
view under uncertainty. 
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break Victim’s little finger rather than her index finger. This will be a slight 
harm to the Attacker, and result in a slightly lesser harm to the Victim. 
 
Finger or Accidental Death: Attacker threatens Victim with a broken finger. 
Victim responds, intending to shoot into the air in order to frighten Attacker, 
thus distracting him so that he will break Victim’s little finger rather than her 
index finger. She is almost certain to succeed in doing this. However, Victim 
knows that there is a very small chance that she will accidentally kill Attacker. 
This will prevent the attack altogether. 
 
If the probabilities of killing and scaring the attacker in the two cases are identical, the 
expected harm and the expected good will be identical. And since harm is intended in 
both cases, then morally-weighted expected harm would also be identical. Therefore, 
Multiplier (Subjective) would treat these two cases identically. 
 
Yet these two cases seem importantly different, due to the differing intentions. At the 
very least, I think there will be some levels of expected harm and good at which it is 
subjectively proportionate to shoot in Finger or Accidental Death, but not Finger or 
Intentional Death. More strongly, I am inclined to say that Victim acts impermissibly 
in Finger or Intentional Death whatever the probabilities: it is potentially permissible 
to risk death, but not to try to cause it, in this scenario, when a broken finger is all that 
is at stake. 
 
An alternative way to try to incorporate the Weak DDE within the Simple View is to 
limit the additional weighting for intended harm only to harm which is intended. 
Expected morally-weighted harm would be calculated by looking at each potentially 
harmful outcome, but only adding additional weight to the intended harm. Imagine 
only Potential Harm 1 (PH1) is intended. We’d then find the Expected Morally-
Weighted Harm in this way: 
Limited Weighting (Subjective): Expected Morally-Weighted Harm = (PH1 x i x 
Probability) + (PH2 x Probability) + (PH3 x Probability)… + (PHn x Probability). 
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This view can potentially differentiate between our two Finger or Death cases: in 
Finger or Intentional Death the additional weighting would be applied to death, whilst 
in Finger or Accidental Death the additional weighting would be applied to scaring the 
assailant with a loud noise. The problem with Limited Weighting (Subjective) is that 
the additional weighting for intentional harm is discounted by probability. This is 
counter-intuitive for several reasons. First, when the chances of succeeding with the 
intentional harm are very low (as in Finger or Intentional Death), hardly any 
weighting will be added. This makes it a very permissive view. Second, our two Finger 
or Death cases could still be seen as equivalents, since the additional weighting 
applied to scaring the assailant in Finger or Accidental Death will be applied to a very 
likely outcome. Indeed, on this view, trying to kill an attacker may produce less 
expected morally-weighted harm (and thus be easier to justify) than trying to mildly 
harm him, even when the potential harms, goods, and their probabilities are kept 
constant.25  
 
Third, this approach doesn’t seem to capture the normative significance of the 
intentions of the defensive agent in the right way. When we intend something, it is 
given special normative significance because of our special relationship to that 
outcome. It isn’t merely one outcome among the pack. Discounting the additional 
weighting for probability seems to mix together two independent moral concerns – 
what am I trying to make happen?; and what is likely to happen? It matters what the 
defensive agent is aiming for, and the significance of that cannot be fully accounted 
for in a calculation which discounts that significance according to the likelihood of it 
occurring. 
 
Limited Weighting (Subjective) discounts the significance of intended harm for 
probability, whereas Multiplier (Subjective) applies a uniform multiplier to all harms. 
                                               
25 For example, imagine that death is 90 units, and mild harm is 1 units. Imagine that there is a 1% 
chance of death, and 99% chance of mild harm, and that intended harm is weighted three times more 
heavily than foreseen harm. If death is intended, then Limited Weighted (Subjective) would calculate 
expected morally-weighted harm as (90 x 0.01 x 3) + (1 x 0.99) = 3.69. If mild harm is intended, then the 
view would calculate expected morally-weighted harm as (90 x 0.01) + (1 x 0.99 x 3) = 3.87. Therefore, 
when everything else is kept constant, intending a harm that is ninety times more serious can result in 
less expected morally-weighted harm. 
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An alternative is to apply additional weight that is sensitive to how much harm is 
intended: 
Intended Harm Multiplier (Subjective): Morally-Weighted Expected Harm = 
Expected Harm x IH (where IH is a multiplier that increases with level of harm 
intended). 
 
Note that this view, like Multiplier (Subjective), will increase all potential harms by 
the same multiplier, regardless of whether they are intended or merely foreseen. This 
view, however, can differentiate between the two Finger or Death cases. When 
probabilities of outcomes are left constant, the morally-weighted expected harm of 
intending death will be greater compared with intending to scare someone. 
Furthermore, this view does not discount the importance of intended harm by its 
probability, and so Finger or Intentional Death may still be very hard to justify 
(though not impossible). Since it has these entailments, this view seems preferable to 
both Limited Weighting (Subjective) and Multiplier (Subjective), and it is compatible 
with the Simple View.  
  
Some may wish to endorse this view. But, if this is the right view, this tells us 
something important about the moral significance of intentions – it isn’t that 
magnitude of harm matters, and, separately, whether or not the harm was intended 
matters, as Rodin’s separation of these two concerns may seem to suggest. Rather, the 
magnitude of intended harm matters. The distinction between these two 
interpretations of the significance of intentional harm is lost when we focus on cases 
in which you are certain as to how much harm you will do. 
 
However, Intended Harm Multiplier (Subjective) would be very demanding in cases 
with large numbers. We are often tempted to think that the Weak DDE gives us a 
consistent ratio of harm to good (all else equal), so we think that we can read from, for 
example, a trolley case to an act of war: if it is permissible to intentionally kill one 
person in order to achieve some level of good, we think it will be permissible to 
intentionally kill 100 people in order to achieve some level of good 100 times greater. 
Intended Harm Multiplier (Subjective) denies this. It says that killing 1oo people 
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would not necessarily be justified. Since the intended level of harm (100 deaths) is so 
much greater, IH would be very large, and so the morally-weighted harm would be 
much greater than 100 times that of intentionally killing one.26 
 
All of the views discussed thus far are compatible with a suitably amended Simple 
View, and the Separation Assumption. Whichever we go for, however, we are left with 
two problems. The first is that they all allow that Finger or Intentional Death may be 
permissible, if the chances of succeeding fall low enough. It could be subjectively 
proportionate to try to kill someone in order to avoid a broken finger. I will return to 
this below, but it is a conclusion that many will want to resist. 
 
Second, none of the views articulated thus far can differentiate between the following 
two cases: 
Intentional Death for a Fingernail: Attackers 1 and 2 threaten Victim with a 
broken fingernail. If Observer does nothing, the Attackers will break the 
fingernail, and also kill Bystander as a side-effect. Observer responds by trying 
to shoot Attacker 1 in the chest, in order to kill him, thus preventing the attack 
on Victim (but allowing Bystander to die). She foresees that if she misses, she 
will kill Attacker 2, thus saving Bystander’s life (but Victim’s fingernail will be 
broken). There is 50% chance that she will succeed in killing Attacker 1. 
 
Intentional Death for a Life: As Intentional Death for a Fingernail, except this 
time Observer tries to shoot Attacker 2 in the chest, in order to kill him, thus 
saving Bystander’s life (but allowing Victim’s fingernail to be broken). She 
foresees that if she misses, she will kill Attacker 1, thus saving Victim’s 
fingernail (but Bystander will die). There is 50% chance that she will succeed in 
killing Attacker 2. 
 
In these cases the expected harm, the level of harm intended, and the probability of 
                                               
26 Imagine IH were 3 times the level of intended harm, and one death = 1 unit of harm. In that case, the 
morally-weighted harm of intentionally killing one person is 3 units (1 x (3 x 1)). The morally-weighted 
harm of intentionally killing 100 people is 30,000 units (100 x (100 x 3)). 
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the intended harm eventuating are identical. Therefore, each of the views canvassed 
above would give us the same level of expected morally-weighted harm. And the 
expected good is also equal in both cases. All of the above ways of incorporating the 
significance of intended harm into the subjective proportionality calculation would 
see these two cases as equivalent.27 Intuitively, however, there is a moral distinction 
between these two cases, one that renders Intentional Death for a Fingernail, at the 
least, much harder to justify. 
 
However, in order for these cases to show that the views canvassed above about 
subjective proportionality are incorrect, I need to show that the moral distinction 
between Intentional Death for a Fingernail and Intentional Death for a Life is one to 
which subjective proportionality in particular ought to be sensitive. 
 
It is easy enough to show that the difference between the cases involves 
proportionality. The only difference between the cases is the way that the intended 
harm matches up with the greater or the lesser good. In Intentional Death for a 
Fingernail, the intended death will do very little good. Precisely what seems to matter 
about this case is that the intentional harm will be objectively disproportionate: while 
there is uncertainty as to whether the intentional harm will come about, there is 
certainty that the intentional harm, if it eventuates, will be objectively 
disproportionate. In Intentional Death for a Life the intended harm is objectively 
proportionate, though an objectively disproportionate outcome is risked. So, the 
difference between the cases concerns the objective (dis)proportionality of the 
intended harm. Nevertheless, some may be tempted to say that while that is indeed 
the difference between the cases, it doesn’t follow that this shows that the moral error 
committed in Intentional Death for a Fingernail is one of subjective proportionality. 
 
                                               
27 The probabilities of the two potential pairings of harm and good need only both be 50% in order for 
Limited Weighting (Subjective) to fail to differentiate between the two cases. Both Multiplier 
(Subjective) and Intended Harm Multiplier (Subjective) would fail to differentiate between the cases 
whatever the probabilities of the two pairings within the cases, provided that the probabilities of the 
pairings were identical across the two cases (for example, a 30% chance of killing-for-a-fingernail, and a 
70% chance of killing-for-a-life). 
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There are two claims that might be made here. One is that the necessity principle is 
the principle that is implicated here. In Intentional Death for a Fingernail, since 
Observer aims at an objectively disproportionate outcome, that should add, we might 
think, to the morally-weighted expected harm. Since Observer could have aimed to 
save a life, thereby giving herself a proportionate aim, Observer does more morally-
weighted expected harm than she needs to when she gives herself a disproportionate 
aim. As such, her conduct is condemned by the necessity principle. But if morally-
weighted expected harm is increased, this ought to matter for subjective 
proportionality as well, even if it also matters for necessity, so the response seems, 
ultimately, to concede that both subjective proportionality and necessity calculations 
will be affected by the intended harm being objectively disproportionate. 
 
Alternatively, it might be claimed that the fact that Observer’s intended harm will be 
objectively disproportionate in one case, but not the other, shows that the problem is 
not with subjective proportionality, but rather something like a ‘right intention’ 
principle. But, if so, this is revealing about the right intention principle. The right 
intention principle is usually thought to require that wars are fought ‘for the right 
reasons’ – that is, for a just cause. But protecting someone’s fingernail is a just cause – 
it would justify very mild levels of harm. The problem in Intentional Death for a 
Fingernail is that the amount of harm is excessive. So, even if this response is granted, 
it is only because the right intention principle turns out to be a proportionality 
principle. The question we ask is not ‘are you doing this for acceptable reasons?’ but 
‘are your ultimate aims proportionate to the harms you intend?’ Whatever we call this, 
this is a question of proportionality that arises under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
If I am right about all of this, it matters for subjective proportionality whether or not 
the intended harm leads to an objectively proportionate outcome.28 However, we 
                                               
28 I have only considered cases here in which we can identify some particular level of intended harm, or 
in which the intended effect on the person that will lead to a particular level of harm (see n. 24 above). 
Sometimes, however, we intend to perform a harmful action which could lead to a variety of harmful 
outcomes. Imagine, for example, that I intentionally throw you down the stairs, averting your attack, 
but I do so knowing that you will either break your arm or your leg. According to my account here, the 
intended harm must be assessed for its proportionality. But in this kind of case, what figure should we 
use for the intended harm? This is a very important but difficult question, and what position we take on 
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cannot ignore the other, unintended, outcomes. Imagine that in Finger or Accidental 
Death shooting in order to scare was overwhelmingly likely to unintentionally kill. 
Whilst this act would pose no problem from the point of view of intentions, it would 
certainly be subjectively disproportionate and should not be performed, due to the 
likely but unintended effects. There are therefore (at least) two factors that an 
approach to subjective proportionality must take into account – the objective 
proportionality of the intended harm; and the full range of potential outcomes 
(including their likelihoods of occurring).   
 
These two factors could be combined in two different ways. The first is that they could 
be independently necessary (and, perhaps, jointly sufficient) conditions for a harmful 
act being subjectively proportionate. That is, acts of intentional harm must pass two 
tests – one asks whether the intentional harm would lead to an objectively 
proportionate outcome; while a second takes account of the full range of possible 
outcomes, and their probabilities. The second way to combine these concerns is to 
make intentional harms that lead to objectively disproportionate outcomes add to the 
morally-weighted expected harm of an action, which will be measured against the 
expected good. This gives us these two views: 
 
Independent Justification: Intended harms are subject to two independent tests. 
First, does the intended harm lead to objectively proportionate outcomes? 
Second, is the overall level of risk acceptable, given all the outcomes that could 
eventuate, and their probabilities of eventuating?29 
 
Incorporation: Intended harms that lead to (or risk leading to) objectively 
disproportionate outcomes are harder to justify. That is, they add to the 
                                               
it will most likely be informed by wider commitments concerning how to understand intentions and 
their moral significance. These are debates and issues I cannot tackle here, for space reasons. Therefore, 
I will briefly outline three stances we might take on this question. First, we could take the intended 
harm to be the expected harm of the intended effect. Second, we could take the intended harm to be 
the minimum possible harm that will achieve the intended good. Third, we could assess the intended 
effect’s Expected Objective Disproportionality (see Section VI for an explanation of this measure). 
29 This second test could, on the argument thus far, be Hurka’s Test. I will show in Sections VI and VII 
why we should reject that role for Hurka’s Test. 
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morally-weighted expected harm of an action. This morally-weighted expected 
harm must be compared with the expected good of acting. 
 
 
Endorsing either of these views involves rejecting the Simple View and the Separation 
Assumption. Independent Justification requires two independent proportionality 
calculations for subjective proportionality, so subjective proportionality cannot simply 
be about comparing morally-weighted expected harm with expected good. And on 
both accounts, it matters whether the intended harm leads to (or may lead to) an 
objectively disproportionate outcome. Since objective proportionality concerns the 
pairings of harm and good that eventuate together, any such concern is incompatible 
with the Separation Assumption. 
 
I can see the attractions of both views, but I am inclined toward Independent 
Justification. To see why, imagine in Finger or Intentional Death that Victim’s attempt 
is successful, and she kills Attacker. Now consider her trying, ex post, to justify her 
actions, by appeal to her ex ante situation. She recognizes that the harm imposed 
turned out to be objectively disproportionate. But, she says, the morally-weighted 
expected harm was far lower – a very low risk of death was imposed upon attacker. In 
my view, this cannot justify her action. This was not a roulette wheel – her action did 
not simply happen to turn out to be objectively disproportionate. Rather, she tried to 
kill and succeeded, knowing that that would produce an objectively disproportionate 
outcome. The fact that she might have been unsuccessful cannot justify the harm she 
has caused, any more than a successful murderer can point toward the fact that he was 
extremely unlikely to succeed, and that other potential outcomes might have been 
beneficial to his victim. 
 
I prefer Independent Justification because it rules out such appeals to less harmful but 
unintended outcomes when the intended harm is objectively disproportionate. The 
Incorporation view, on the other hand, merely puts a thumb on the scales for intended 
objectively disproportionate harms, making them harder to justify, but it does not rule 
them out. Thus, objectively disproportionate intended harms can still, on that view, be 
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made subjectively proportionate by unintended outcomes: one is permitted to try to 
bring about a harm that one would not be permitted to bring about if one knew one 
would be successful. 
 
Out of the range of possible harms that could stem from Victim’s action, she has a 
special moral relationship to a particular one: the intended harm. That intended harm 
must figure in her justification of her action. And in order to justify that harm, she 
must justify it in terms of the outcome(s) it will lead to, and in particular the objective 
proportionality of those outcome(s). If she is not trying to bring about an objectively 
proportionate outcome, her action is not subjectively proportionate. Only 
Independent Justification takes this stance. 
 
V JUSTIFYING INTENDED HARM 
I have argued that, when harm is intended, it matters for subjective proportionality 
whether the intended level of harm leads to objectively disproportionate outcomes. 
Thus far we have considered cases in which we are uncertain as to whether the 
intended harm will eventuate, but certain as to what would follow from that harm 
eventuating. These cases, therefore, avoided some difficult questions about exactly 
what we should care about when we care about whether or not the intended harm 
‘leads to’ objectively disproportionate outcomes: that the intended harm might lead to 
an objectively disproportionate outcome; that it carries an unacceptable risk of an 
objectively disproportionate outcome; or that an objectively disproportionate outcome 
is intended? In other words, I have claimed that intended harm must be subject to a 
proportionality calculation. But we must have some measure of goodness to put on the 
other side of that calculation. 
 
To help make things clear, consider the following the case: 
Certain Death, Uncertain Defence: Attacker threatens Victim’s life. Victim has 
only one defensive option available to her – to shoot attacker and kill him. 
There are three possible good outcomes of killing attacker, compared with 
doing nothing: that Victim will prevent a minor harm to an innocent bystander, 
Alice, but will not save her own life; that Victim will save her own life; that 
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Victim will save the lives of Barbara and Charlotte, who are innocent 
bystanders, but not her own life. Victim hates Alice, Barbara, and Charlotte and 
would actively prefer them to be harmed. She in no way intends to save them. 
She intends to save her own life, and only shoots with that intention in mind. 
 
Victim’s act, as an intentional harm, must be justified as subjectively proportionate, 
and in order to do so, I have argued, we must look at whether the intended harm leads 
to objectively proportionate goods. But which of the goods on offer should we 
measure the intentional killing against?30 
 
There are two broad approaches we can take here. Either we must, in some way, take 
account of all of the goods that the intended harm will produce (including both the 
objectively disproportionate outcome of saving Alice, and the objectively 
proportionate outcome of saving Barbara and Charlotte)31, or we should measure the 
intended harm only against the good outcome that the defensive agent intends it to 
produce. 
 
My own view, which I will tentatively defend here, is that intended harms should be 
defended as proportionate by comparing them with the intended good (namely, in 
this case, saving Victim’s life only). The main question we have is whether goods 
which may be the product of the intended harm but are not the intended goods can 
help to justify the intended harm qua intended harm. (Recall that another calculation, 
or another element of the subjective proportionality calculation, will take account of 
the full range of possible outcomes). 
 
I think that unintended goods cannot help to justify intended harms. When someone 
is looking to harm others, we must essentially ask the putative harmer (or demand 
that she asks herself) two questions: First, what are you trying to do? And second, 
                                               
30 For related discussion, see Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, 94-95. 
31 This could be achieved by measuring the expected good of the intended harm, or the Expected 
Objective Disproportionality of the intended harm. I introduce the notion of Expected Objective 
Disproportionality in the next section. 
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what do you think will happen? In order to justify herself, both answers need to be 
proportionate. When harm is intended, in answering the question ‘what are you trying 
to do?’ the answer must involve a particular pairing of harm and good – if she is to be 
justified, then she must be trying to bring about harm in order to bring about some 
good outcome. Therefore, she should justify that pairing, which means (among other 
things) that it must be objectively proportionate. When an intentional harm may 
produce unintended goods, I think we should say the same thing as we say about 
unintended harms – you can’t appeal to the fact that you might fail in what you are 
trying to achieve in order to justify trying to bring about a particular outcome. 
 
While I have tried, here, to briefly defend the idea that intended harms must be 
justified as proportionate to intended goods, I am more confident of the more general 
claim that it matters, for subjective proportionality, whether or not intended harms 
lead to objectively disproportionate outcomes. Therefore, those who reject the 
argument of the present section, should not necessarily reject the more general 
argument that the objective (dis)proportionality of intended harms has moral 
significance relevant to subjective proportionality, and thus that the Simple View and 
Separation Assumption must be rejected. 
 
VI EXPECTED OBJECTIVE DISPROPORTIONALITY 
The Simple View states that subjective proportionality is reducible to Hurka’s Test. 
Thus far, I have argued that this comparison is not sufficient for subjective 
proportionality when the harm is intended, since it matters whether or not intended 
harms lead to objectively proportionate outcomes. However, along the way we met 
various other ways of incorporating the significance of intentions into subjective 
proportionality which were compatible with the Simple View. Some readers may have 
been tempted to accept one of those, and thus to affirm the Simple View and the 
Separation Assumption. Others might deny the moral significance of intentions, and 
thus deny that what I have said thus far has any relevance whatsoever to subjective 
proportionality. 
 
Even those who accept my analysis in full thus far may see space left for the Simple 
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View, or Hurka’s Test at least. First, they may think the Simple View remains the right 
view when intended harms are not involved. Second, the argument thus far has led us 
to Independent Justification: a position which requires a proportionality test for 
intended harms and a second test that takes account of the full range of possible 
harms and goods. For all we have said thus far, Hurka’s Test may be the right account 
of this second test. 
 
I think, however, that there is a deeper problem with the Simple View and the way 
that Hurka’s Test handles the range of potential harms and goods. Therefore, I think 
the Simple View fails even if my arguments around intentional harms are rejected, and 
that Hurka’s Test should play no role in subjective proportionality. Consider a case of 
non-intentional harming in which each defensive option, if performed, is certain to 
prevent an attack completely. However, each comes with different risks concerning 
the morally-weighted harm that may occur. Let’s imagine that -10 units of morally-
weighted harm will be objectively proportionate. The defensive agent has the 
following defensive options. 
Option 1 – Certainty: -8 units of morally-weighted harm for sure. 
Option 2 – Uncertainty 1: 50% chance of -10 units of morally-weighted harm; 
50% chance of -6 units of morally-weighted harm. 
Option 3 – Uncertainty 2: 50% chance of -14 units of morally-weighted harm; 
50% chance of -2 units of morally-weighted harm. 
 
The Simple View would view each of these options as morally identical. Each will do 
(for sure) the same amount of good, and each has an expected morally-weighted harm 
of -8 units. However, I think there is a morally important distinction between Options 
1 and 2 on the one hand, and Option 3 on the other. In Option 1 the harmful outcome 
is certain, and is within the objectively proportionate limit – it is clearly subjectively 
proportionate. In Option 2 there is uncertainty as to how much harm will be done, but 
since each potential harmful outcome will be objectively proportionate, it must be 
subjectively proportionate. In Option 3, however, there is a serious risk that the 
harmful outcome will be objectively disproportionate. The amount of good that will be 
done can only justify up to -10 units of harm, and yet it is as likely as not that -14 units 
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of harm will be done. This outcome is one that we would be forbidden to bring about 
knowingly. If this greater harm comes about, people will be harmed in a way that 
wrongs them – the good outcome is not good enough to justify the harms inflicted 
upon them. 
 
This case is designed to illustrate that we are concerned about proportionality under 
uncertainty because we are concerned that our harmful action may turn out to be 
objectively disproportionate.32 If all of our options are objectively proportionate, the 
fact that we are uncertain about which will eventuate is not a concern from the point 
of view of proportionality. The Simple View, relying on its expected harm-expected 
good comparison, cannot capture our worries about objective disproportionality 
because objective disproportionality comes about when a particular combination of 
harm and good come into existence together, and the Simple View takes no account of 
these combinations. 
 
In order to put issues of intended harm to one side, let us focus on a case in which all 
of the potential harms are merely foreseen. Consider this outcome tree: 
                                               
32 The only account I know which takes the risk of objective disproportionality into account is Adil 
Ahmad Haque’s. However, Haque’s account, in my view, suffers from some crucial defects. He argues 
that what matters is whether the act will ‘probably’ (i.e., will more likely than not) result in an 
objectively proportionate outcome. I disagree with this test for two reasons. First, it fails to take into 
account how disproportionate our action may be: all objectively disproportionate potential outcomes 
are simply treated alike. Second, any lowering of the chances of a disproportionate outcome are ignored 
once we get over the ‘more likely than not’ threshold: a 51% chance of an objectively proportionate 
outcome is just as good as a 100% chance. Haque couples this principle with test similar to Hurka’s. See 
Adil Ahmed Haque, Law and Morality at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 195-199. 
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In this case, the expected morally-weighted harm is -18.133, and the expected good is 
18.81.34 According to the Simple View, this would be subjectively proportionate 
(assuming, for simplicity, a -1:1 proportionality ratio35). Expected harm and expected 
good are calculated by looking ‘horizontally’ – first at all the possible harms, and then 
all the possible goods. But if, as I have argued, we should be worried about the 
particular combinations of harm and good that may eventuate, we need to look at the 
‘vertical’ combinations. Here we see that the most likely combination (-20 units of 
harm for 1 unit of good, which is 81% likely to occur36) is seriously disproportionate. 
And there is a 91% chance that the act will be objectively disproportionate. Almost all 
of the ‘expected good’ is coming from a 9% chance of a large amount of good. In other 
words, the beyond proportionate goods of that (unlikely) outcome are allowed to fully 
compensate for the proportionality shortfalls of more likely options: there is nothing 
in Hurka’s Test that even attaches any additional weight or concern to objectively 
                                               
33 Expected Harm = (-1x0.1) + (-20x0.9) = -18.1. 
34 The good outcomes are 0, 1, and 200 units of good. 0 units is 10% likely to occur. 1 unit is 81% likely to 
occur (since there is a 90% chance of -20 units of harm occurring, and a 90% chance that 1 unit of good 
will follow from that). 200 units is 9% likely to occur (since there is a 10% chance of it following from 
the 90% chance of -20 units of harm). Therefore, Expected Good = (ox0.1) + (1x0.81) + (200x0.09) = 18.81. 
35 Recall that the harm is morally-weighted, and so it certainly does not follow that a -1:1 ratio here 
implies that one can proportionately cause one unit of harm in order to avoid one unit of harm. 
36 Since 1 unit of good has a 90% chance of being produced if -20 units of harm are produced, of which 
there is a 90% chance. 
Possible Goods
Possible Morally-
Weighted Harms
Action
Bomb a 
Military 
Target
-1 (10%)
0
-20 (90%)
1 (90%) 200 (10%)
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disproportionate outcomes. This does not seem to take the idea of proportionality as a 
limit seriously – it is supposed to be a ceiling on the harm we are allowed to impose 
for a given level of good, not an average we should not exceed.  
 
We can take ‘vertical’ combinations into account if we look at each combination in 
turn, and assess its objective disproportionality. In order to assess a combination’s 
objective disproportionality, we need to look at two things. First, is the harm 
objectively proportionate or disproportionate? Second, if it is objectively 
disproportionate, how seriously objectively disproportionate is it? 
 
How do we measure how seriously objectively disproportionate an outcome is? There 
are, broadly-speaking, two ways in which we can do so. One is that we say that any 
death or injury that is part of an objectively disproportionate outcome is objectively 
unjustified, and that all objectively unjustified deaths and injuries count against an 
outcome. So, if -5 units of harm would be an objectively proportionate outcome, and 
an outcome involves -6 units of harm, we should count all -6 units of harm as 
objectively unjustified, and this is the measure of how seriously objectively 
disproportionate the outcome is. An alternative is to measure surplus harm. So, on the 
assumption that -5 units of harm would have been objectively proportionate, in an 
outcome where there is -6 units of harm, there is -1 unit of surplus harm – that is how 
far past the objectively proportionate maximum the harm is. 
 
Which is the right approach will depend at least in part on how we intend to use the 
resulting measure, an issue to which I will return shortly. I find the surplus harm 
version more plausible, since it allows that there is a difference between causing 100 
deaths when the objectively proportionate limit is 99, compared with causing 100 
deaths when the objectively proportionate limit is 5. The ‘unjustified harm’ approach 
can’t recognize a difference between these two cases, since in both there are 100 
objectively unjustified deaths. 
 
For now, then, I will use the surplus harm approach. To see how this works, let us look 
at the above outcome tree. The first combination (-1 harm, 0 good) is -1 unit of harm 
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over the objective proportionate maximum. The second (-20, 1) is -19 units of harm 
over the objectively proportionate maximum. The third (-20, 200) is objectively 
proportionate. In fact, it is a long way under the objectively proportionate maximum 
harm (which is -200 units), but from an objective proportionality perspective this is 
irrelevant. Recall that proportionality is a limit – there are not extra ‘proportionality 
points’ for doing less harm than the maximum allowed. Since the outcome is 
objectively proportionate, it should score a 0 – there is no objective disproportionality. 
We can then assess the ‘Expected Objective Disproportionality’ of the action as a 
whole by using these scores and the probability of each combination. In this case, the 
overall Expected Objective Disproportionality of acting would be 15.49.37 
 
I am convinced that this calculation captures something that is morally relevant in 
determining what we are permitted to do. It assesses the expected magnitude of how 
how seriously objectively disproportionate a harmful action is likely to be, and the 
lower the number the better. This leads to some attractive normative entailments that 
differ from those of Hurka’s Test. Depending on how it is used (on which, see below) 
Expected Objective Disproportionality would either rule out, or make harder to justify, 
risky wars – wars that are almost certain to be objectively disproportionate, but carry 
some very low chance of being better-than-proportionate. Consider a war that only 
just passes Hurka’s Test, but is almost certain to be seriously objectively 
disproportionate. Allowing Expected Objective Disproportionality to play a role would 
allow us to rule out such a war, whereas the Simple View has no resources to do so. 
 
VII USING EXPECTED OBJECTIVE DISPROPORTIONALITY 
Whilst the Expected Objective Disproportionality measure ought to be used in some 
way, I have not, as yet, said how. I will lay out some options here, and explain why I 
favour the view that I do. 
 
                                               
37 The first outcome (-1,0) is 10% likely to occur, and has a OD score of 1, therefore its Expected 
Objective Disportionality (EOD) = (1x0.1) = 0.1. The second outcome (-20,1) has an OD score of 19, and is 
81% likely to occur. Therefore, its EOD = (19x0.81) = 15.39. The final outcome (-20,200) has an OD score 
of 0, since it is objectively proportionate. Therefore, overall the action’s EOD = 15.39+0.1+0 = 15.49. 
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1. No Expected Objective Disproportionality 
Proportionality is a limit. If an action is objectively disproportionate, it ought to be 
ruled out. If we are to take the idea of proportionality as a limit seriously, we might 
think that if an action carries even a risk of being objectively disproportionate, it 
should also be ruled out. Therefore, an Expected Objective Disproportionality of 
greater than zero would be subjectively disproportionate. 
 
This view, however, is clearly too restrictive. Consider a scenario in which I can kill 
one person. This is almost certain to end a war, saving many thousands of lives. There 
is also a tiny chance that it will not do any good. If so, there is some chance the act will 
produce an objectively disproportionate outcome. Yet surely this act should be 
allowed, and should be regarded as subjectively proportionate. 
 
2. Minimize Expected Objective Disproportionality 
We could instead minimize Expected Objective Disproportionality: pick the option 
with the lowest score. This seems sensible, since if we are worried about objective 
disproportionality, we should seek to minimize it. 
 
The central problem with this approach is that it may end up ruling out any (course 
of) action with any Expected Objective Disproportionality. Doing nothing – allowing 
oneself (or others) to be harmed – does no harm. It is therefore certainly 
proportionate, and so has no Expected Objective Disproportionality. Therefore 
minimizing Expected Objective Disproportionality may require us to do nothing 
whenever doing something has some risk of Expected Objective Disproportionality, no 
matter how slight. This is implausible for the same reasons as the previous position. 
 
This might be avoided if we exclude ‘doing nothing’ as an option. However, if we do 
this, and then use Expected Objective Proportionality to compare our defensive 
options, picking the one with the least Expected Objective Disproportionality, this has 
three problems. First, it seems to assume that one of our defensive options will be 
permissible, or at least subjectively proportionate, when we should assume no such 
thing. Second, and relatedly, this seems to misunderstand the job of proportionality. It 
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is proportionality’s job to tell us which (if any) of our defensive options are potentially 
permissible by comparing them with doing nothing. It is necessity’s job to compare 
our different defensive options. 
 
The third problem here is that by looking only at an action’s Expected Objective 
Disproportionality, then more and more expected good could never speak in favour of 
an action with greater Expected Objective Disproportionality. Consider a case in 
which there are several (only just) objectively disproportionate outcomes, and one 
objectively proportionate outcome. It surely makes a difference whether the 
objectively proportionate outcome is one in which one person will die and twenty will 
be saved, or one in which one person will die and two million will be saved. 
Minimizing Expected Objective Disproportionality would fail to take account of this. 
 
3. Morally-Weighted Expected Harm+ 
Another option is to add an action’s Expected Objective Disproportionality to its 
morally-weighted expected harm on the negative side of the subjective proportionality 
calculation, and compare these to its expected good. In other words, each potential 
death counts against an action, but so does the Expected Objective Disproportionality. 
In Parfit’s terms, we must add the non-deontic-badness of the deaths to the deontic 
badness of the objectively disproportionate outcomes.38 Together, these must be 
justified as proportionate to the expected good of acting. It is worth remarking that 
even though this approach resembles the Simple View, it is not compatible with it, as 
we defined it at the outset. The additional weighting from Expected Objective 
Disproportionality is generated by particular pairings of harm and good, which 
violates the Separation Assumption. 
 
One problem with this approach is that it ‘double counts’ the goods of the objectively 
disproportionate possible outcomes, at least if we use the ‘surplus harm’ approach to 
Expected Objective Disproportionality. These goods count, first, in working out how 
seriously disproportionate a given harmful outcome is, and then again in helping to 
                                               
38 Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 351. 
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offset the Expected Objective Disproportionality. Imagine, for example, that my act 
has two possible outcomes – it will either save John at objectively proportionate cost, 
or Elis at objectively disproportionate cost. Saving John would only count toward the 
expected good of the act. But saving Elis would count twice. First, it would be used to 
calculate how seriously objectively disproportionate that outcome would be, (so, if 
saving Elis would justify 100 units of harm, but would actually cause 150 units of harm, 
that potential outcome would be objectively disproportionate by -50 units). Second, 
saving Elis (along with saving John) would be used as a potentially good outcome in 
calculating the expected good of acting. In other words, saving Elis would both make 
the bad outcome less bad, and be considered, independently, as a good outcome. 
 
Another problem with this approach is that, since it allows that there is some 
‘tolerable level’ of Expected Objective Disproportionality, it would allow that an action 
in which each and every potential outcome was objectively disproportionate could be 
subjectively proportionate, provided the Expected Objective Disproportionality were 
low enough. This is clearly unacceptable – if all of our options are objectively 
disproportionate, we ought not to proceed. This problem could be fixed by adding an 
additional rule, which is that in order to be subjectively proportionate, an action must 
at least have a chance of being objectively proportionate. 
 
4. Proportionate Disproportionality 
An alternative way to take Expected Objective Disproportionality into account is to 
take Expected Objective Disproportionality to be something that stands in need of 
justification. This seems to demand the development of a ‘meta-proportionality’ – how 
much objective disproportionality can be risked? In order to know this, we need to 
know what Expected Objective Disproportionality ought to be compared with. 
 
Proportionality, in the simplest terms, is about comparing bad things with good 
things. Here, the bad things are the objectively disproportionate potential outcomes. 
Just how bad they are, collectively, is measured by Expected Objective 
Disproportionality. Conversely, the good things are the objectively proportionate 
potential outcomes. What we need to know is whether it is worth risking the bad 
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potential outcomes for the sake of the good potential outcomes. So, our focus in 
looking for the good against which to balance these bad outcomes should be on the 
objectively proportionate potential outcomes. Here we have two choices. We could 
compare Expected Objective Disproportionality with the Expected Goodness of 
Objectively Proportionate Outcomes, or with the Expected Surplus Goodness of 
Objectively Proportionate Outcomes. 
 
To see the difference between these two measures, consider this ‘outcome tree’: 
 
 
Let us assume that -1:1 is the proportionality ratio. The first outcome (-10:0) is 
objectively disproportionate. Risking this outcome must be justified. The second 
outcome (-18:20) is objectively proportionate. The third outcome (-10:20) is also 
objectively proportionate. Our question, then, is whether the possibility of the second 
and third outcomes can justify risking the first. There are two ways to think about this. 
First, we could look at the goods that will be produced in the objectively proportionate 
outcomes (the Expected Goodness of the Objectively Proportionate Outcomes), in 
which case, both outcomes are the same, producing 20 units of good each. Or, second, 
we could look at the surplus good – that is, the goods beyond the objectively 
proportionate minimum (the Expected Surplus Goodness of the Objectively 
Proportionate Outcomes), in which case the third outcome looks better than the 
Possible Goods
Possible Morally-
Weighted Harms
Action Harmful Action
-10
0
-18
20
-10
20
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second. 
 
I think that which of these is the right view depends on whether the putative 
justification for causing or risking harm is a liability justification (narrow 
proportionality) or a lesser-evil justification (wide proportionality). That is, when the 
person has made themselves liable to harm, so long as the goods are bought at the 
cost of proportionate harm, the level of harm does not count against a good outcome, 
so we should look at Expected Goodness of the Objectively Proportionate Outcomes. 
Therefore, the second and third outcomes would be judged identically: both produce 
20 units of goodness at ‘acceptable cost’ – the harms in question do not run up against 
rights. However, when we are harming innocent persons, even acceptable costs are 
regrettable in a way that they are not when done to the liable. Therefore, these harms 
still count against an outcome, and so we should look at the Expected Surplus 
Goodness. 
 
To put things more concretely: imagine it is objectively proportionate for me to cause 
harms up to paralyzing an attacker if this will avert the threat that they pose. 
Outcomes in which I avert the threat at the cost of a broken finger and at the cost of a 
broken leg should be viewed identically for the purposes of seeing whether objectively 
disproportionate outcomes (e.g., those in which the attacker dies) are worth risking. 
But if I am harming an innocent person to avert some threat, it very much matters 
whether their leg or finger is broken in order to avert the threat, even if both are 
objectively proportionate. 
 
Expected Objective Disproportionality ought to be taken into account in subjective 
proportionality calculations. Of the ways in which it might be taken into account 
canvassed above, Morally-Weighted Expected Harm+ and Proportionate 
Disproportionality seem to be the most plausible contenders. Whichever we choose, 
however, in taking account of pairings of harm and good, we have gone beyond the 
Simple View and the Separation Assumption. 
 
My own view is that Proportionate Disproportionality best captures the way in which 
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objective proportionality is a limit, without leading to the implausible entailments of 
No Objective Disproportionality. Proportionate Disproportionality says that any 
coupling of harm and good that is objectively disproportionate counts against an 
action, and if we are to risk such outcomes, we must justify them in terms of the 
proportionate potential outcomes. Although it does not view potential objective 
disproportionality as ruling out an action, it does take the line between objective 
proportionality and objective disproportionality to be a morally significant threshold. 
This also means that an action which could only produce an objectively 
disproportionate outcome could never be viewed as subjectively proportionate. 
 
Adopting this calculation is compatible with still leaving some role for Hurka’s Test in 
our account of subjective proportionality. However, once we have this measure, it is 
very hard to see what additional work the direct comparison between expected harm 
and expected good can do. For this reason, I reject Hurka’s Test altogether: subjective 
proportionality isn’t about directly comparing expected harm with expected good at 
all. Instead, we must look at pairings of harm and good, paying special attention to 
some of them. 
 
VIII CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have explored the important topic of subjective proportionality. If we 
want to be able to perform proportionality calculations in the real world, we need to 
know how to do them under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
I have tried to show the following. First, it is not obvious how we should fold the 
moral significance of intentions into subjective proportionality – several possible views 
were developed and discussed. Second, the most plausible views take into account 
whether the intended harm leads to objectively proportionate or disproportionate 
outcomes. Third, a particularly attractive variant of that stance is that it is an 
independent subjective proportionality criterion that the coupling of harm and good 
intended is objectively proportionate. Fourth, the risk of objective disproportionality 
should be taken into account: we should take account of Expected Objective 
Disproportionality. Fifth, this can be done in several ways, but one especially attractive 
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way is for Expected Objective Disproportionality to be measured against the Expected 
Goodness of Objectively Proportionate Outcomes. How this latter figure is calculated 
differs according to whether we are looking at wide or narrow proportionality. 
 
However, I take this paper to be a starting point for discussion. There is much more to 
be said about what the best account of subjective proportionality will look like. I have 
flagged some of these issues, and some of my own arguments have been tentative. One 
important further issue is what the best account of necessity under uncertainty will 
look like, and how subjective proportionality and subjective necessity ought to 
interact. For now, I hope I have at the least shown that not all plausible views include 
the direct comparison between expected harm and expected good which it is natural 
to reach for, and that the issue of subjective proportionality is a complex and 
important one. 
